

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02566 01 OF 07 250348Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----033341 250353Z /61

O 250158Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1475
AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 7 TEL AVIV 2566/1

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

CHEROKEE

JERUSALEM FOR USDEL

FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 20

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, XF, US
SUBJECT: ME
EWIFVLWITH PRESIDENT SADAT -- FEBRUARY 24

1. SUMMARY: EILTS AND I MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH SADAT
THIS NOON DURING WHICH HE ASKED THAT I CONVEY A
"MESSAGE" TO BEGIN AND LAUNCHED INTO A LONG AND AT
TIMES EMOTIONAL AND DISJOINTED MONOLOGUE. HIS THEMES
WERE LARGELY FAMILIAR ALBEIT DEEPLY HELD ONES: I.E.,
HIS FEELING THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT UNDERSTOOD AND RESPONDED
TO HIS INITIATIVE, HIS INTENSE DESIRE TO CUT THROUGH
PROBLEMS OF LANGUAGE AND PROCEDURE TO ACHIEVE FUNDA-
MENTALLY NEW SITUATION, HIS READINESS TO SIGN AGREEMENT
IN "TWO OR THREE DAYS" ON SINAI AND OFFER FULL NORMAL

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02566 01 OF 07 250348Z

RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IF BEGIN WOULD SHARE HIS
VISION OF PEACE, HIS BITTERNESS OVER WHAT HE SEES
AS BEGIN'S MISREPRESENTATION OF HIS VIEWS AND BELIEF
THAT WAY IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS ARE CURRENTLY BEING
CONDUCTED IS UNLIKELY TO BRING RESULTS. SADAT SAID
HE WANTED "GOOD NEIGHBOR" RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL
BUT THESE COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY IF ISRAEL IS READY FOR

"BIG BUSINESS", BY WHICH HE OBVIOUSLY MEANT READINESS FOR AGREEMENT ON BROAD TERMS THAT HE (SADAT) HAS SET OUT. SADAT RESPONDED TO PROPOSAL WHICH I CONVEYED ON BEGIN'S BEHALF FOR RECONVENING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE BY SAYING HE WAS NOT OPPOSED, BUT FROM SUBSEQUENT REMARKS IT SEEMS APPARENT TO ME -- PERHAPS EILTS CAN GET CLARIFICATION THROUGH KAMEL -- THAT HE DID NOT SEE MERE CONTINUATION OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE DECLARATION AS GROUNDS FOR RECONVENING. HE DID NOT MENTION ACHIEVEMENT OF DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AS REQUIREMENT FOR RECONVENING BUT SEEMED CLEARLY TO BE SAYING THAT IF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WERE RECONVENED BREAKTHROUGH WOULD AT LEAST HAVE TO FOLLOW. HE ALSO INJECTED IDEA, OBVIOUSLY NOT CLEARLY THOUGHT THROUGH, THAT THE TWO COMMITTEES SHOULD MEET IN AL-ARISH AND BEERSHEVA - "THE CAPITALS OF THE SINAI AND THE NEGEV." SADAT ASKED THAT HIS REMARKS AND HIS MESSAGE TO BEGIN BE GIVEN TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND AT CLOSE OF CONVERSATION REMARKED THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAD BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE SINAI II AGREEMENT RETURNING SINAI PASSES AND OIL FIELDS TO EGYPT DESPITE FACT THAT SUMMER OF 1975 WAS "DARKEST AND WEAKEST" TIME ANY U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAD GONE THROUGH AND OTHER PARTY HAD MAJORITY IN CONGRESS. EARLIER IN MEETING SADAT RATHER BLUNTLY CORRECTED FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL REGARDING KAMEL'S INSISTENCE ON NEED TO BRING IN HUSSEIN BEFORE EGYPT CAN ACT. SADAT SAID HUSSEIN WOULD NOT REVEAL HIS HAND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 02566 01 OF 07 250348Z

AT THIS STAGE REGARDING THE WEST BANK AND WOULD WANT TO WAIT FOR OTHERS TO "PAVE THE WAY FOR HIM." SADAT FELT IT BEST NOT TO TRY TO PRESS HUSSEIN. IMPORTANT THING WAS TO MAKE PROGRESS; THEN HUSSEIN WOULD COME ALONG, OR IF HE DID NOT IT WOULD NOT MATTER. SADAT DID NOT REPEAT NOT MAKE POINT RAISED BY KAMEL YESTERDAY THAT ASWAN LANGUAGE WAS ACCEPTABLE TO EGYPT ONLY IF IT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO HUSSEIN. ON THE CONTRARY, HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN THIS WORD TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON ACCEPTING ASWAN LANGUAGE AND NEVER GOES BACK ON HIS WORD.

AT END OF MEETING, SADAT REQUESTED THAT WE PUT HIS "MESSAGE" TO BEGIN IN LOGICAL SEQUENCE FOR ME TO PRESENT TO BEGIN SUNDAY. THIS POSES SOME OBVIOUS PROBLEMS, BUT I BELIEVE WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO DO SO AND, INDEED, THAT THERE MAY BE BENEFIT IN HELPING IN THIS WAY TO GET ACROSS SOME OF THE RATHER INCHOATE BUT CLEARLY DEEPLY FELT DISILLUSIONMENT SADAT FEELS. IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT SADAT PROBABLY HAS IN MIND NOT ONLY TRYING TO GET THROUGH TO BEGIN WHAT HE FEELS HAS NOT BEEN UNDERSTOOD ABOUT FUNDAMENTAL MEANING OF HIS JERUSALEM INITIATIVE, BUT ALSO MAKING RECORD FOR

HISTORY (THROUGH US) IF IT FAILS. EILTS WILL BE BETTER
ABLE THAN I TO JUDGE, BUT I HAD UNEASY IMPRESSION THAT
SADAT WAS TRYING TO SAY TO US THAT HE FEARS HE MAY FAIL.
SADAT DID NOT RAISE POINT KAMEL MADE TO ME YESTERDAY
ABOUT HIS CONCERN THAT DURING BEGIN VISIT WE WILL WEAKEN
ON POSITIONS SET FORTH IN WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT AT END OF
HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. WHEN I MADE POINT AT END OF OUR
TALK THAT I HAD REPORTED THIS, HOWEVER, SADAT WAS QUICK
TO RESPOND THAT ANY WEAKENING OF THOSE POSITIONS
WOULD BE FATAL TO HIM.

EILTS WILL BE CONSULTING WITH KAMEL SATURDAY ABOUT PUTTING
SADAT'S "MESSAGE" TO BEGIN IN MORE STRUCTURED FORM FOR
SECRETARY'S AUTHORIZATION FOR ME TO CONVEY TO BEGIN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 02566 01 OF 07 250348Z

END SUMMARY.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02566 02 OF 07 250401Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----033441 250404Z /61

O 250158Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1476
AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 7 TEL AVIV 2566/2

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

CHEROKEE

JERUSALEM FOR USDEL

FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 20

2. MEETING WAS AT PRESIDENT'S REST HOUSE IN ISMAILIYA.

WHILE SADAT WAS OBVIOUSLY STILL FEELING EFFECTS OF HIS COLD, HE WAS ANIMATED AND AT TIMES EMOTIONAL. FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL WAS THE ONLY OTHER PARTICIPANT ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE. ON OUR SIDE, KORN WAS PRESENT AS NOTETAKER.

3. I SAID I WAS VERY HONORED TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT. SADAT SAID HE HAD HAD A VERY BAD AND UNPLEASANT COLD BUT WAS NOW FEELING SOMEWHAT BETTER. HE HAD ASKED ME TO COME TO ISMAILIYA DESPITE HIS ILLNESS AND FACT IT WAS MOSLEM SABBATH, BECAUSE HE WANTED TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM ME ABOUT MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02566 02 OF 07 250401Z

I SAID THE TALKS I HAD HAD IN ISRAEL WERE REALLY A FIRST ROUND. I HAD MET WITH DAYAN AND WITH BEGIN. QUITE APART FROM THE PRINCIPLE SUBJECT OF OUR CONVERSATION I WANTED TO MENTION THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS HEAVILY PREOCCUPIED BY ITS INTERNAL DEBATE OVER THE SETTLEMENTS. DISCUSSION OF THE SETTLEMENTS TOOK UP FIVE HOURS IN THE CABINET MEETING LAST SUNDAY AND THE MATTER WILL PROBABLY COME UP AGAIN IN THIS COMING SUNDAY'S CABINET MEETING. I NOTED THAT THERE WAS OBVIOUSLY A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEBATE THE ISRAELIS ARE HAVING OVER THE SETTLEMENTS AND THE VERY STRONG POSITION THAT WE HAVE TAKEN ON THIS SUBJECT. SADAT SAID HE KNEW AND APPRECIATED THIS FACT. I POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS A STRONG MOVEMENT IN ISRAEL TO PUT A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS BUT THERE ARE ALSO PEOPLE IN BEGIN'S GOVERNMENTS, AND ESPECIALLY IN HIS PARTY, WHO OPPOSE SUCH ACTION. I ADDED THAT WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE GOI WILL REACH A DECISION TO FREEZE THE SETTLEMENTS.

4. I SAID THAT IN MY TALKS WITH DAYAN AND BEGIN IT HAD BEEN VERY CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELIS WANT TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO RECEIVING EGYPTIAN COMMENTS. FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL HAD GIVEN ME THE EGYPTIAN PAPER, AND I WOULD PASS IT TO DAYAN AND BEGIN ON MY RETURN TO ISRAEL. I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE PERSONAL INTEREST THAT

PRESIDENT SADAT HAD TAKEN IN THE MATTER OF
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 02566 02 OF 07 250401Z

THE EGYPTIAN PAPER. I HAD TO SAY THAT I DID NOT THINK ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT ALL THE EGYPTIAN SUGGESTIONS, BUT I COULD PROMISE THAT I WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PUT ACROSS THE EGYPTIAN POINT OF VIEW. THE MOST DIFFICULT ELEMENT WILL OBVIOUSLY BE THE LANGUAGE ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. I SAID THAT AS PRESIDENT SADAT KNEW FROM HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER WE THINK ISRAEL MUST IN THE END BE PERSUADED TO ADOPT THE ASWAN LANGUAGE, WHICH WE RECOGNIZE ALREADY REPRESENTS A COMPROMISE FROM EGYPT'S POINT OF VIEW. I ADDED THAT I HAD TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT EGYPT HAS NOT FORMALLY ACCEPTED THE ASWAN LANGUAGE AND WOULD PREFER A MORE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO SELF-DETERMINATION. BUT I SAID IT WAS HELPFUL IN MY OWN MIND TO KNOW THAT EGYPT WILL ACCEPT THE ASWAN LANGUAGE. I DID NOT EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE FULL AGREEMENT ON A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES DURING MY CURRENT STAY IN THE AREA BUT I WOULD HOPE TO DEFINE AND NARROW THE DIFFERENCES SO AS TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE DISCUSSIONS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE WHEN PRIME MINISTER BEGIN COMES TO WASHINGTON. I ADDED THAT IN MY REPORT TO WASHINGTON ON MY CONVERSATION THE PREVIOUS EVENING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL I HAD MADE CLEAR THE IMPORTANCE EGYPT ATTACHES TO BRINGING HUSSEIN INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. SADAT REMARKED THAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING THAT HUSSEIN HAS JUST VISITED WASHINGTON SECRETLY. I SAID THAT WAS ENTIRELY INCORRECT.

5. I TOLD SADAT THAT DURING MY MEETING IN JERUSALEM I HAD ALSO HAD A LONG DISCUSSION WITH BEGIN AND DAYAN REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE WITHDRAWAL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 02566 02 OF 07 250401Z

PROVISION OF RESOLUTION 242 TO ALL FRONTS. SADAT COMMENTED "THEY ARE NOT HAPPY ABOUT THIS." I SAID BEGIN CAME TO POWER ON A PARTY PLATFORM WHICH CLAIMS SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SADAT SAID

"WHAT DO THEY CALL IT IN HEBREW, YES,
JUDEA AND SAMARIA." I SAID OUR
POSITION IS QUITE CLEAR; RESOLUTION 242 CALLS FOR
WITHDRAWAL ON ALL FRONTS. THIS HAS BEEN
CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY ALL THE PARTIES SINCE
1967. I SAID WE HAD STATED OUR POSITION ON
THIS UNEQUIVOCALLY TO THE ISRAELIS. THE
PROBLEM WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE
ADDRESSED WHEN PRIME MINISTER BEGIN
GOES TO WASHINGTON.

6. FOR THIS REASON WE BELIEVE IT USEFUL TO BEGIN
TO EXPLORE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH ISRAEL THE
FUTURE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I POINTED

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02566 03 OF 07 250419Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----033563 250422Z /61

O 250158Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1477
AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 7 TEL AVIV 2566/3

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

CHEROKEE

JERUSALEM FOR USDEL

FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 20

OUT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF THE EGYPTIAN
GOVERNMENT COULD GIVE US ITS IDEAS ON THIS. ULTI-
MATELY WE WILL WANT TO PRESENT ISRAEL OUR OWN
VIEWS, BUT IT WILL BE EASIER TO DO THAT IF WE CAN
GIVE THEM EGYPT'S IDEAS. THE ONLY DOCUMENT ON THE
TABLE NOW CONCERNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS THE

ISRAELI PLAN. KAMEL TOLD SADAT THAT HE HAD TOLD ME IN OUR CONVERSATION THE PREVIOUS EVENING THAT SINCE I WOULD BE SEEING HUSSEIN SOON, I COULD ASK FOR HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ON FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SADAT TURNED TO KAMEL AND SAID QUITE EMPHATICALLY, "DON'T BE NAIVE, MOHAMMAD. KING HUSSEIN WON'T GIVE ANY VIEWS." SADAT SAID HUSSEIN "THINKS HIMSELF MORE SHREWD THAN ANY LEADER IN THE AREA" AND IS NOT AT ALL SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02566 03 OF 07 250419Z

LIKELY TO LEVEL HIS CARDS. I SAID I AGREE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DRAW HUSSEIN OUT. SADAT SAID THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS VERY KEEN TO HAVE HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDIS COME ALONG WITH EGYPT IN TALKS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SADAT FIRST SAID, "HUSSEIN WOULD JOIN THE TALKS WHEN THE SAUDIS ORDER HIM TO", BUT THEN ADDED THAT HUSSEIN IS TRYING TO KEEP A FAVORABLE IMAGE WITH SYRIA. HUSSEIN WANTS EVERYBODY TO DO HIS DIRTY WORK FOR HIM. SADAT SAID HE DID NOT AGREE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL THAT WE SHOULD CHASE AFTER HUSSEIN. LET'S WAIT AND NOT PUSH HIM, SADAT SAID. LET'S REACH SOME CONCRETE FOUNDATION FOR THE WHOLE THING. THEN HUSSEIN WILL COME IN, OR IF HE DOES NOT THEN IT WILL NOT MATTER.

7. I ASKED IF SADAT NONETHELESS AGREED THAT I SHOULD EXPLORE WITH HUSSEIN THE QUESTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SADAT SAID YES, BUT HUSSEIN WILL NOT GIVE YOU AN ANSWER. I POINTED OUT THAT HUSSEIN DOES HAVE PROBLEMS. HE HAS TAKEN A STAND THE SYRIANS DO NOT LIKE AND HAS GOTTEN A GOOD DEAL OF CRITICISM FROM THEM. SADAT SAID HE REALIZED THIS; HUSSEIN WAS SUPPORTING HIM; BUT HE FELT THAT HUSSEIN WANTS TO ENJOY THE BENEFIT OF OTHER PEOPLE'S EFFORTS. "THAT IS HIS WAY. HE WILL WAIT FOR US TO PAVE THE WAY FOR HIM." SADAT SAID WE SHOULD NOT PRESS HUSSEIN, WE SHOULD "TRY TO REACH SOME CONCRETE BASIS." THEN HUSSEIN WILL EITHER COME TO US OR LOSE, LIKE THE PLO. SADAT ADDED THAT IN HIS OPINION THE PLO "HAD LOST THE WHOLE THING," AND "IN THE END ARAFAT WILL FALL." SADAT RECOMMENDED PLO LEADER KHALED AL-HASSAN WHO, HE SAID, WAS ONE OF THE FOUNDERS OF SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 02566 03 OF 07 250419Z

THE PLO AND A MODERATE WHO "DOES NOT AGREE WITH WHAT IS HAPPENING." AL-HASSAN IS RESPECTED IN AND KUWAIT, SADAT SAID, BUT NOT AMONG THE REJECTIONISTS. LET'S HAVE HIM REPRESENT THE PLO AT THE TALKS, SADAT SAID, AND WE WILL HAVE SOME OTHER MODERATES AND SOME PALESTINIANS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

8. I SAID PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAD ASKED ME TO RAISE ONE QUESTION WITH PRESIDENT SADAT. BEGIN IS CONCERNED OVER THE LACK OF SYMMETRY IN THE STATUS OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL COMMITTEES, THE FORMER IN SESSION IN CAIRO AND THE LATTER IN SUSPENSE. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED ME TO ASK THE PRESIDENT IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RECONVENE THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. I SAID I HAD TOLD BEGIN THAT MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT PRESIDENT SADAT PREFERRED THAT THERE BE AGREEMENT ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPALS BEFORE THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE BE RECONVENED, BUT I DID UNDERTAKE TO CONVEY THE PROPOSAL. I SAID I WOULD BE HAPPY TO PASS SADAT'S RESPONSE BACK TO BEGIN. BEGIN FEELS THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION IS AN UNEQUAL ONE WHICH GIVES AN ADVANTAGE TO EGYPT, BUT ALSO THE ISRAELIS ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO DIRECT CONTACT. DIRECT CONTACT WITH EGYPT, SADAT SAID. I NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TOLD US THAT EVEN WHEN DIRECT CONTACT RESUMES THEY WILL EXPECT THE U.S. TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE.

9. SADAT UTTERED A HEAVY SIGH, EXCHANGED A FEW REMARKS IN ARABIC WITH KAMEL AND WAS SILENT FOR A MOMENT. THEN HE SAID HE KNEW WHAT IS IN THE MINDS OF THE ISRAELIS WHEN THEY PROPOSE THE RECONVENING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. IT IS NOT SYMMETRY THAT WORRIES BEGIN. IT IS THE CONTACT WITH EGYPT THAT HE IS VERY KEEN TO MAINTAIN. BEGIN FEELS "CORNERED" FOLLOWING MY TRIP TO AMERICA AND EUROPE, SADAT SAID. SADAT THEN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 02566 03 OF 07 250419Z

RELATED THAT BEGIN HAD INVITED ALL THE MAJOR JEWISH FINANCIAL LEADERS TO SWITZERLAND AND HAD "DONE HIS BEST" TO PERSUADE THEM NOT TO MEET WITH SADAT IN PARIS. BEGIN MADE SUPER-HUMAN EFFORTS, SADAT SAID, BUT THEY ALL CAME - THE ROTHSCHILDS, THE GOLDMANS, ALL THE BIG JEWISH FINANCIERS. SADAT SAID THEY HAD ALL TOLD HIM THAT HIS VIEWS ARE REASONABLE AND THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS IRRESPONSIBLE. THEY HAD COME TO PARIS DESPITE BEGIN'S HEAVIEST OPPOSITION.

10. SADAT SAID THAT DURING HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER THE PREVIOUS

DAY HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT HE HAD AN IDEA IN HIS MIND BUT
THAT HE COULD NOT ARTICULATE IT PRECISELY. I
HAD A CERTAIN FEELING, SADAT SAID, THAT IS OFTEN
THE WAY MY IDEAS TAKE SHAPE. THEREFORE I ASKED
THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO BRING YOU HERE TODAY
EVEN THOUGH WE HAD NOT PLANNED TO HAVE A MEETING.
SADAT SAID HE HAD ALSO WANTED ME TO COME

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02566 04 OF 07 250425Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----033633 250429Z /61

O 250158Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1478
AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 7 TEL AVIV 2566

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

CHEROKEE

JERUSALEM FOR USDEL

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO. 20

TO ISMAILIYA BECAUSE HE KNEW THAT I HAD MET WITH
BEGIN AND HE DID NOT WANT TO CREATE A "MISUNDERSTANDING."
I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE MISINTERPRETED IF I DID NOT MEET
WITH YOU, SADAT SAID.

11. SADAT THEN SAID HE WANTED TO GIVE ME A MESSAGE
TO CONVEY TO BEGIN. HE WOULD TELL US WHAT HE WANTED
TO SAY TO BEGIN, AND AMBASSADOR EILTS AND I SHOULD PUT
HIS IDEAS INTO PROPER ORDER, AND I SHOULD PRESENT
THEM TO BEGIN WHEN I MEET WITH HIM ON SUNDAY. EILTS
AND I SAID WE WOULD OF COURSE DO AS THE PRESIDENT
WISHED. SADAT SAID HE WANTED THE MESSAGE TO BE IN
THE FORM OF POINTS. IT WOULD BE AN ORAL MESSAGE BUT I

COULD LEAVE IT AS A PIECE OF PAPER WITH BEGIN.
IT WAS LATER AGREED BETWEEN SADAT, KAMEL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02566 04 OF 07 250425Z

AND US THAT WE WOULD GIVE KAMEL A TEXT BASED ON SADAT'S
PRESENTATION. EILTS WOULD PASS THIS ON SATURDAY TO
KAMEL WHO WOULD CHECK IT WITH SADAT AND THEN CABLE IT
TO ME FOR PRESENTATION TO BEGIN ON SUNDAY. SADAT SAID
HE ALSO WANTED TO BE SURE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD BOTH
A COPY OF THE PAPER AND A COMPLETE REPORT OF HIS
(SADAT'S) REMARKS EXACTLY AS HE SET THEM OUT TO ME.

12. FOLLOWING IS A FULL TEXT OF SADAT'S PRESENTATION OF
HIS "MESSAGE" IN AS NEARLY VERBATIM FORM AS NOTETAKER
COULD RECORD THEM:

BEGIN QUOTE:

--WHEN I BROUGHT MY FOREIGN MINISTER BACK FROM
JERUSALEM I DID SO BECAUSE I THOUGHT THE DISCUSSIONS
WERE HEADED IN THE WRONG WAY. I HAVE THE SAME IDEA NOW. WHY? YOU
COULD SPEND ANOTHER TWO OR THREE YEARS NEGOTIATING
IN THE WAY YOU WERE IN JERUSALEM. THE
PROBLEM YOU ARE DEALING WITH NOW IS
WORDING. WHAT WE SHOULD DO IS DEAL WITH
SUBSTANCE ITSELF. THE WORDING WILL BE
EASY IF WE AGREE ON THE SUBSTANCE, AND
WE CAN CONCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT
IN A WEEK. MY INITIATIVE WAS STARTED IN ORDER
TO GET AWAY FROM PROCEDURAL AND WORDING PROBLEMS
AND GO DIRECTLY TO SUBSTANCE.

WHERE DO WE STAND NOW? AFTER MY VISITS TO
JERUSALEM AND ISMAILIYA, AND MY TALKS IN THE
US AND EUROPE WE ARE STILL IN THE SAME POSITION
WE WERE IN BEFORE MY VISIT TO JERUSALEM. WHY?
I HAVE POINTED OUT THAT WHAT THEY (ISRAEL)
RAISED IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OR IN THE
POLITICAL COMMITTEE COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, AS THOUGH MY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 02566 04 OF 07 250425Z

INITIATIVE HAD NEVER EXISTED, WITHOUT RELATION
TO MY NEW CONCEPT. WE ARE STILL IN THE SAME
SITUATION, TRYING TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF
WORDING. LET ME MAKE CLEAR, I AM NOT GOING
BACK ON MY INITIATIVE. THIS SHOULD BE TOLD
TO THEM. I CAN NEVER DESERT THE INITIATIVE EVEN IF
NOTHING IS ACHIEVED BY IT, BUT I WOULD LIKE HISTORY

TO HAVE MY THOUGHTS ON RECORD, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE
WHOLE WORLD ENDORSES MY VIEWS.
--I AM NOT AGAINST RECONVENING THE
POLITICAL COMMITTEE. THIS SYMMETRICAL ARGUMENT
OF BEGIN'S IS NOT WHAT HE REALLY MEANS. WE
AGREE THAT THE COMMITTEES CAN RECONVENE HERE
OR IN ISRAEL. BEHIND HIS (BEGIN) ARGUMENT ON
RECONVENING IS THE FACT THAT THEY WANT TO MAINTAIN
DIRECT CONTACT (SADAT ADDED HERE, BUT SAID
DO NOT TELL THIS TO THE ISRAELIS, "THEY ARE
VERY JEALOUS AMONG THEMSELVES, PARTICULARLY
WEIZMAN AND DAYAN"). I AM NOT AGAINST RECONVENING
OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OR THE MILITARY
COMMITTEE, BUT WE ARE HAVING THE WRONG DIALOGUE.
WHAT IS THE USE OF SHUTTLING WHEN WE HAVE NOT
AGREED ON THE MAIN GUIDELINES OF A COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT. EITHER HE (BEGIN) WANTS THROUGH
THIS SHUTTLE TO GAIN SOME TIME SO THAT HE CAN
DEFINE AND PUT HIS POSITION PRECISELY, OR HE DOES
NOT WANT PEACE. LET ME TELL HIM THIS: I AM
NOT IMPOSING CONDITIONS. I AM NOT SAYING WE
WILL NOT CONVENE OR NOT HAVE DIRECT CONTACTS UNLESS
YOU DO SO AND SO. LET US AGREE THAT ISRAEL HAS
A NEED FOR SECURITY. LET US ALSO AGREE THAT
SECURITY SHOULD NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF LAND
OR SOVEREIGNTY. THIS IS AN ELEMENTARY
PRINCIPLE OF THE WORLD TODAY.
EVEN IF THIS SHUTTLE PROCESS IS CONTINUED FOR
100 YEARS THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE OUR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 02566 04 OF 07 250425Z

POSITION. WHY ARE WE LOSING TIME NOW?
--ANOTHER POINT IS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.
THE LAND AND SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE IS ONE THE
ISRAELIS HAVE NO RIGHT TO RAISE. I HAVE GIVEN CARTER
LOTS OF CONCESSIONS ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION.
I AGREED ON THE ASWAN LANGUAGE, AND I NEVER GO BACK ON
MY WORD. IN THE INTERIM PERIOD BETWEEN
SIGNING THE AGREEMENT AND THE SELF-DETERMINATION
THAT CARTER HAS DEFINED I AM READY TO TAKE
MY PART IN GAZA TOGETHER WITH ISRAEL AND THE
UN TO ASSURE SECURITY. WHEN CARTER ASKED IF
ISRAEL COULD MAINTAIN MILITARY POINTS FOR
SECURITY DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, I SAID YES,
NO OBJECTIONS. BUT THEY SHOULD BE CLEAR AND
DEFINED AND NOT VAGUE EITHER ON THE WEST BANK
OR GAZA. THIS IS MY POSITION I HAVE ALREADY GIVEN
CARTER. THE ISRAELIS HAVE SECURITY PROBLEMS
ON THE WEST BANK, YES. I KNOW IT.
EXTREMIST ELEMENTS CAN TAKE HOLD OF THE WEST BANK AND

THREATEN THE HEART OF ISRAEL. I THINK ON THE
WEST BANK THE UN SHOULD TAKE OVER, NOT HUSSEIN BUT

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02566 05 OF 07 250443Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----034100 250447Z /20

O 250158Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1479
AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 7 TEL AVIV 2566

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

CHEROKEE

JERUSALEM FOR USDEL

FROM ATHERTON

U.S. DEL NO. 20

LATER A PARTY OF FOUR COULD BE FORMED, WITH
THE UN, ISRAEL, HUSSEIN AND THE PALESTINIANS.
(SADAT SAID HE WOULD NOT WANT IT IN THE
MESSAGE TO BEGIN BUT HE WANTED TO SAY THAT
SHIMON PERES HAD ASKED HIM IF HE (SADAT)
WOULD AGREE TO EXCLUDE THE UN FROM ARRANGEMENTS
ON THE WEST BANK. SADAT SAID HE HAD TOLD
PERES HE WAS READY TO DO SO.)
--WE ARE HEADING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION.
WORDING WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM. EVERYONE WILL
TRY TO SELL HIS WORDING TO THE OTHER. WE CAN SOLVE
THE WHOLE THING IF WE AGREE ON THE ELEMENTS
OF A SETTLEMENT. WE CAN SOLVE IT IN TWO OR THREE DAYS.
WHEN I VISITED ISRAEL I SAID I WANTED TO CREATE
NEW FACTS AND CONCEPTIONS. FROM MY SIDE THIS WAS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02566 05 OF 07 250443Z

ACHIEVED. EGYPT NO LONGER HAS ANY BITTERNESS. UNDER NASSER THERE WAS MUCH BITTERNESS, NOW THERE IS NOT. EGYPT SEES PEACE AS ITS UTMOST GOAL. IN THIS EGYPT IS DEFYING THE WHOLE ARAB WORLD. THERE IS A NEW CONCEPTION ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE. LET US DROP ALL THE PAST. BUT ISRAEL HAS NOT UNDERSTOOD THIS. WEIZMAN WAS HERE WITH ME IN THIS PLACE (ISMAILYA) THE FIRST TIME HE CAME TO EGYPT. I TOLD HIM ABOUT WHAT THIS PLACE MEANS TO ME. I ASKED HIM HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO GET FROM ISRAEL TO CAIRO. I TOLD HIM IT TAKES ONLY 20 MINUTES FROM HERE TO BEN GURION AIRPORT. THIS IS THE CONCEPT OF EGYPT AND OF MY INITIATIVE. NEW FACTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN EGYPT WHICH REFLECT THE STEPS THAT WE HAVE TAKEN TOWARD PEACE.

--I AM TELLING YOU THIS BECAUSE IT SHOWS TO WHAT EXTENT I AM READY TO GO AND TO WHAT EXTENT WE REALIZE THE NEW FACTS OF THE SITUATION. BUT UNFORTUNATELY THIS EXISTS ONLY ON ONE SIDE. ISRAEL THINKS ONLY OF STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE. OUR LAND IS NOT SOMETHING THAT WE CAN CONCEDE. BUT EXCEPT FOR LAND I AM READY TO GIVE THEM EVERYTHING, EVERYTHING IN THE NATURE OF PEACE. NO ONE COULD HAVE IMAGINED THAT THIS COULD HAVE HAPPENED. I GAVE THEM DIRECT CONTACTS. I WENT TO JERUSALEM, TO ISMAILYA, WE MET IN THE CAIRO CONFERENCE AND IN THE JERUSALEM COMMITTEE. I GAVE THEM A SENSE OF SECURITY, BECAUSE I RECOGNIZE THERE IS A PROBLEM OF SECURITY FOR ISRAEL. MY CONCEPTION IS OF GOOD NEIGHBORSHIP. THIS IS THE VIEW THAT PREVAILS HERE. WHATEVER IS NEEDED TO HAVE GOOD NEIGHBOR RELATIONS WE WILL DO, BUT WE WILL NOT GIVE LAND. AFTER SINAI II THEY STARTED TO ABUSE US. THIS AGREEMENT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 02566 05 OF 07 250443Z

(SINAI II) WILL BE IN FORCE UNTIL NEXT OCTOBER. MY INITIATIVE WAS TOWARD GOOD NEIGHBOR RELATIONS. THEY COULD NEVER HAVE DREAMED OF THIS. YESTERDAY ASSAD MET WITH BREZHNEV (SADAT ADDED THAT BREZHNEV IS A DYING MAN). WHAT WAS THE RESULT. THE REJECTIONIST CAMP AND THE SECOND WORLD POWER ARE ASKING FOR GENEVA. BEGIN IS GIVING THEM CARDS TO PLAY AGAINST ME. THEY HAVE KILLED SABAI. TELL BEGIN I WILL ANSWER THE TERRORISTS, I WILL HANDLE THEM. BEGIN IS THE ONE WHO HAS HARMED THE WHOLE CAUSE, HE HAS HARMED ME MORE THAN THE REJECTIONISTS. IF HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE NEW CONCEPTION THERE WILL NOT BE ANY CHANCE. WHAT I SAID DOES

NOT MEAN I DO NOT WANT YOUR SHUTTLE. I HAVE SAID THIS FOR YOU
TO TELL HIM.

--BEGIN DISTORTS EVERYTHING I SAY. FOR EXAMPLE, IN
SUDAN I WAS ASKED OUR POSITION REGARDING SINAI AND
THE PALESTINIANS. I SAID ISRAEL COULD PLOW UP THE
SETTLEMENTS WHEN THEY LEAVE. THEY DID THIS IN 1957
WHEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER MADE THEM LEAVE. BEGIN
IMMEDIATELY COMES OUT AND SAYS SADAT WANTS TO BURN
THE SETTLEMENTS AND WE HAVE BUILT THE SETTLEMENTS
NOT TO BE BURNED. I NEVER ANSWERED BEGIN ON THIS
BUT I NEVER USED THE WORD BURN. THE WORLD KNOWS THIS.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISTS WERE THERE, THEY HEARD
ME, THEY RECORDED EVERYTHING. BEGIN SAID SADAT
WENT BACK ON HIS WORD CONCERNING THE PASSES. WEIZMAN
SAT HERE WITH ME AND GAMASY WHEN WE DISCUSSED THIS.
I TOLD GAMASY IN FRONT OF WEIZMAN THAT I HAD PROMISED
BEGIN THAT MY FORCES, MY MAIN FORCES, WILL NOT
EXCEED THE PASSES. BUT BEGIN SAID SADAT HAD GONE
BACK ON HIS WORD AND SHOULD KEEP THE PROMISE HE MADE
IN JERUSALEM. THIS IS NOT THE WAY FOR GOOD NEIGHBORS.
ALSO, WHEN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WAS SITTING IN
JERUSALEM THE ISRAELI RADIO WAS REPORTING ON
SETTLEMENTS IN YAMIT, MY LAND. THEY WANTED TO
PUT US BEFORE A FAIT ACCOMPLI. DAYAN TOLD THEM YOU
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 02566 05 OF 07 250443Z

WILL BE UNDER EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND HE WAS BOOED.
SHRON SAID THEY WILL STAY UNDER ISRAEL AND HE WAS
CHEERED. ISRAEL WILL NEVER TAKE FROM ME MY LAND.
I WANT THIS MESSAGE TO REACH BEGIN AND CARTER. I
DON'T KNOW WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE, BUT LET'S
TRY TO PUT FACTS CLEARLY SO WE WON'T FORGET THEM AND
START IN THE WRONG DIRECTION.

--TELL THEM MY INITIATIVE WAS MADE TO FACILITATE
THEIR POSITION WITH THEIR PUBLIC OPINION. MY INITIATIVE
WAS TO FACILITATE THEIR JOB AND FACILITATE THE
JOB OF MY FRIEND CARTER SO A SETTLEMENT CAN BE
ACHIEVED WITH LESS PRESSURE AND DIFFICULTY. BUT IF
THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS, THEY WILL REGRET IT.
I HAVE CHOSEN MY PATH AND IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE
HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS IN THE WORLD WHOM I PROMISED

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02566 06 OF 07 250455Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----034412 250457Z /11

O 250158Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1480
AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 7 TEL AVIV 2566

EXDIS(HANDLE AS NODIS)

CHEROKEE

JERUSALEM FOR USDEL

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO. 20

NOT TO LET DOWN I COULD NOT CONTINUE ON IT. IF
I HAD NOT MADE MY DECISION I WOULD CONSIDER THAT
WHAT I HAD DONE WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS WRONG.
I WOULD HAVE DECLARED TO THE WHOLE WORLD THAT THERE
WAS NO CHANCE. BUT THERE IS NO GOING BACK FOR ME,
NO LETTING DOWN. I WANT THIS MESSAGE TO REEACH
BEGIN. I AM NOT PUTTING MINES ON THE ROAD TO PEACE.
THE INITIATIVE CAN CONTINUE.
--BEGIN HAS ALREADY HARMED ME MUCH MORE THAN ANYONE
ELSE IN MY WHOLE POLITICAL CAREER. HE HAS HARMED
ME VERY SEVERELY. SINAI II EXPIRES NEXT OCTOBER BUT
WE SHALL HAVE LOTS OF OCTOBERS TO COME. BUT THE
WAY WE ARE WORKING WE SHALL NEVER ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING.
I WILL HAVE TO TELL MY PEOPLE THE TRUTH, I CANNOT
CONTINUE TO DECEIVE THEM. THE ISRAELI POSITION IS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02566 06 OF 07 250455Z

MUCH WORSE THAN BEFORE MY INITIATIVE. THE ISRAELI
POSITION IS UNDERMINING EVERYTHING I HAVE DONE, BEFORE
THE WHOLE WORLD. I WANT THIS MESSAGE DELIVERED TO
CARTER.
--TELL BEGIN IF HE IS READY-- I WILL USE AN
AMERICAN WORD--FOR BIG BUSINESS, I AM READY TOMORROW.
NO OLD CONCEPTIONS. IN ONE SESSION I AM READY TO
SIGN AN AGREEMENT WITH GENERAL LINES OF A COMPREHENSIVE

SETTLEMENT. THERE CAN BE A FIRST PHASE OF WITHDRAWAL
AND WE CAN POSTPONE THE SECOND PHASE UNTIL
THE PALESTINE QUESTION IS SETTLED. WE ARE IN A
VICIOUS CIRCLE. THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW WORKING
AND PUSHING VERY HARD TO PROVE THAT I AM WRONG.
I RISKED EVERYTHING IN MY INITIATIVE. IF ID DOES NOT
SUCCEED I HAVE THE COURAGE TO RESIGN AT ANY MOMENT.
I HAVE THE COURAGE TO DO THAT. CONVEY THIS MESSAGE
TO BEGIN. TELL HIM I AGREE ON THE ATHERTON MISSION.
I AM READY FOR BIG BUSINESS WHENEVER THEY ARE. WE
WILL LET THIS WAY OF DEALING CONTINUE FOR ANOTHER
FEW MONTHS. OCTOBER WILL COME. WHAT WILL HAPPEN
I DON'T KNOW. I AM READY FOR CONVENING THE MILITARY
COMMITTEE AND THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. THIS TIME THE
TWO COMMITTEES CAN CONVENE IN BOTH COUNTRIES. EL
ARISH IS THE CAPITAL OF THE SINAI AND BEERSHEVA IS
THE CAPITAL OF NEGEV, AND THE COMMITTEES CAN CONVENE
THERE. BUT LET US NOT CONVENE AND THEN LET DOWN THE WORLD.
THE WHOLE THING HINGES ON ISRAEL'S UNDERSTANDING
GOOD NEIGHBORSHIP. I AM OPEN FOR BIG BUSINESS, YES."
END QUOTE

13. AS SADAT SIGNALLED THAT HE HAD COMPLETED HIS
MESSAGE, I SAID I WOULD OF COURSE CONVEY IT TO
BEGIN AND TO PRESIDENT CARTER. I ADDED THAT I WANT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 02566 06 OF 07 250455Z

TO SAY FOR MYSELF PERSONALLY THAT I DID NOT THINK
PRESIDENT SADAT WOULD BE PROVEN WRONG. I WAS CONFIDENT
HE WOULD BE PROVEN RIGHT, AND I WAS CONFIDENT PRESIDENT CARTER
ALSO BELIEVED THIS. I SAID I ALSO THOUGHT THAT HIS INITIATIVE
HAD STARTED A DEBATE IN ISRAEL THAT WILL PRODUCE RESULTS.
AS A RESULT OF SADAT'S VISIT TO CAMP DAVID WE
NOW HAVE A COMMON CONCEPT OF THE STRATEGY FOR PEACE.
MY SHUTTLE WILL OBVIOUSLY NOT SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS
WE FACE BUT IT IS PART OF THAT STRATEGY.

14. SADAT ASKED THAT I TELL PRESIDENT CARTER THAT
HE WANTED TO GET HIS MESSAGE TO BEGIN AND TO THE
PRESIDENT BEFORE BEGIN VISITS WASHINGTON. HE ALSO
WANTED TO POINT OUT TO THE PRESIDENT THAT IN THE
DARKEST DAYS THAT ANY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HAD
KNOWN, IN THE SUMMER OF 1975 WHEN THERE WAS AN
APPOINTED PRESIDENT AND EVERYBODY WAS TALKING
ABOUT THE WATERGATE AND LOCKHEED SCANDALS, WHEN
KISSINGER WAS "HATED AND ATTACKED" BY THE PRESS AND
THE CONGRESS, FORD HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THE SECOND DIS-
ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. FORD HAD ACHIEVED THIS IN THE
"DARKEST AND WEAKEST DAYS OF ANY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION,"
WHEN CONGRESS WAS CONTROLLED BY THE OTHER PARTY.

IF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER COULD MAKE ISRAEL
LEAVE THE SINAI IN 1957, AND IF PRESIDENT FORD
COULD ACCOMPLISH WHAT HE DID, SADAT SAID,
HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER COULD
ACCOMPLISH EVEN MORE. SADAT REITERATED THAT HE FELT
THE PRESENT COURSE OF ACTION ON WHICH WE ARE EMBARKED
WOULD "NEVER REACH ANYTHING", BUT HE AGAIN ADDED THAT
THIS WOULD NOT MEAN THAT EGYPT WAS AGAINST MY MISSION,
ON THE CONTRARY HE WANTED ME TO CONTINUE MY WORK. THE
UNITED STATES IS A FULL PARTNER, HE SAID, NOT A
GO-BETWEEN OR A MEDIATOR. HE REPEATED THAT I SHOULD TELL
BEGIN HE WAS READY TO "DO BIG BUSINESS."

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 02566 06 OF 07 250455Z

15. SADAT BEFORE CLOSING SAID HE WANTED TO MENTION
THAT SOME OF HIS AIDES WERE SAYING THAT THE UNITED
STATES MAY BE RELUCTANT TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT A
SETTLEMENT WITHOUT THE SOVIET UNION. THEY SAY THAT
THE UNITED STATES IS WAITING IN ORDER TO FIND MEANS
TO BRING THE SOVIET UNION IN. HE SAID HE HOPED THIS
WAS NOT THE CASE.

16. AT CLOSE OF CONVERSATION SADAT SAID HE WAS
HAPPY HE WAS SENDING MESSAGE TO BEGIN. HE HAD "GOTTEN
IT OFF HIS CHEST" AND FELT MUCH BETTER.

17. IN VIEW OF EILTS FAMILIARITY WITH SADAT'S
THINKING AND LONG EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH HIM,
I BELIEVE HE IS IN BEST POSITION TO GIVE COHERENT
ARTICULATION TO THE VIEWS THAT SADAT WANTS PASSED TO
BEGIN. EILTS HAS AGREED TO DO THIS AND WILL DRAW UP
TEXT BASED ON THE MONOLOGUE QUOTED ABOVE, AND PASS
IT TO KAMEL TO CHECK WITH SADAT AND THEN TO ME IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE OUTLINED PARA 11.
FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN GENERAL POINTS WE THINK SHOULD
BE COVERED:
--SADAT'S FEELING THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT UNDERSTOOD AND RESPONDED
TO HIS

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02566 07 OF 07 250459Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----034609 250501Z /11

O 250158Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1481
AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 7 TEL AVIV 2566

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

CHEROKEE

JERUSALEM FOR USDEL

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO. 20

"NEW CONCEPTION".
--HIS ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF LEGITIMACY OF ISRAEL'S CONCERN FOR
SECURITY.
--HIS BELIEF THAT NOTHING CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH
CURRENT METHOD OF NEGOTIATION;
--HIS READINESS NONETHELESS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING
THROUGH THE US AND TO COOPERATE IN EVERY WAY WITH
MY MISSION; AND HIS DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE
PEACE EFFORT.
--HIS INTENSE DESIRE TO CUT THROUGH PROBLEMS OF
LANGUAGE AND PROCEDURE;
--HIS WISH FOR GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL
AND HIS READINESS TO GIVE ISRAELIS ANYTHING THEY WANT
IN THE AREA OF NORMAL PEACEFUL RELATIONS.
--HIS INSISTENCE THAT HE WILL NOT COMPROMISE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02566 07 OF 07 250459Z

ON TERRITORY AND SOVEREIGNTY (IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR
WHETHER SADAT MEANT THIS TO APPLY ONLY TO
SINAI).
--HIS FEELING THAT BEGIN HAS DAMAGED HIS (SADAT'S)
POSITION.
OBVIOUSLY THIS PARTICULAR POINT WILL REQUIRE DELICATE PHRASING
TO AVOID OFFENDING BEGIN BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SADAT
WILL WANT HIS COMPLAINTS CONVEYED.
--HIS IDEA ABOUT RECONVENING THE TWO COMMITTEES IN
AL-ARISH AND BEERSHEVA.

17. SADAT'S RESPONSE TO BEGIN'S PROPOSAL FOR RECONVENING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL REQUIRE SPECIAL HANDLING. WHILE SADAT SAID HE WAS READY TO RECONVENE THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, HE SEEMED ALSO TO BE SAYING THAT HE SAW NO USE IN DOING SO UNLESS THERE WERE ASSURANCES OF RAPID PROGRESS. ALL OF US--INCLUDING KAMEL--WERE A LITTLE UNCLEAR AFTERWARDS ABOUT EXACTLY WHAT SADAT WANTED TO TELL THE ISRAELIS, BUT ON READING THROUGH THE TRANSCRIPT OF HIS REMARKS I DO NOT THINK IT HIS INTENTION THAT POLITICAL COMMITTEE BE RECONVENED SIMPLY TO PURSUE CURRENT WORK ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. HE APPARENTLY HAD IN MIND SOME DEVELOPMENT OR PROPOSAL OF GREATER IMPORT AS BASIS FOR RECONVENING. HOWEVER, PERHAPS EILTS CAN GET CLARIFICATION OF THIS WHEN HE TALKS WITH KAMEL TOMORROW.
LEWIS

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, PEACE PLANS, CAT-C, CHEROKEE 02/25/78
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 25 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978TELAV02566
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: P840137-1991, N780003-0074
Format: TEL
From: TEL AVIV
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780212/aaaaajqf.tel
Line Count: 998
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 7ee421cf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 19
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3472209
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CHANGED> MCM 20040616; <DBA CHANGED> MCM 20040616
Subject: ME
TAGS: PGOV, PBOR, XF, US, EG, IS, (SADAT, ANWAR), (BEGIN, MENACHEM)
To: STATE CAIRO MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/7ee421cf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014